---
title: When Someone Else's Misfortune Feels Good
url: https://oosioo.com/en/p/%EB%82%A8%EC%9D%98-%EB%B6%88%ED%96%89%EC%9D%B4-%EB%B0%98%EA%B0%80%EC%9A%B8-%EB%95%8C
date: 2026-11-17T11:34:09+00:00
author: SYSOP
summary: The notebook asked: is it legitimate to feel happy because of someone else's misfortune? As a child I was taught not to gloat; as an adult it seems everyone does, and then I notice that thinking "I'm not like them" is itself a comparison. I follow the lines Aristotle, Kant and Nietzsche drew around this feeling; a little house that shrinks to a hut beside a palace and soldiers who were unhappier because promotion came faster; university staff who became unhappy only if they were below the median when colleagues' salaries went online; and the experiments that split schadenfreude into envy, deservingness, rivalry and a shaken self-esteem. Why "I'm different" is the most common illusion of all, and which ways of loosening comparison's grip actually showed an effect. A playground lets you rate where your own schadenfreude comes from. The thirty-seventh piece in A Page for Today.
---
# When Someone Else's Misfortune Feels Good

![On a deep navy background, the title "When Someone Else's Misfortune Feels Good" sits beside a balance scale: a small house on one pan rises while a palace on the other pan sinks, with the caption "Your house stays the same; the house next door changes its weight."](/uploads/3d9636ae4aadc5f4.webp =720)

The page I opened today held a single question.

> Is it legitimate to feel happy because of someone else's misfortune?

What I was taught as a child was clear. Don't gloat over other people's misfortune or lack. Don't build your self-esteem on being better than someone. And yet, the more people I meet, the fewer seem to live by that lesson. When a colleague misses a promotion, something like relief shows behind the words of comfort; when someone who was riding high stumbles, the group chat comes alive. I shake my head at it, and then I catch myself. Isn't thinking "I'm not like them" its own way of putting myself on top?

That is what makes the question hard. The moment you try to judge the feeling, the one judging climbs onto the scale as well. So today I decided to follow how people have tried to get hold of this feeling, through some 2,400 years of records.

## An old name, an old fork in the road

Schadenfreude, the German word for pleasure at another's misfortune, joins "harm" and "joy." People often say only German has such a word. That isn't true. Aristotle already named the feeling in Greek, epichairekakia; Dutch has leedvermaak; Chinese has 幸災樂禍, delight in another's calamity. In Korean the closest everyday word is probably *ssaemtong*, roughly "serves you right."

What's interesting is that Aristotle treats the feeling differently in two places. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he lists epichairekakia as always bad. But in the *Rhetoric* he writes: "If you are pained by the unmerited distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by the punishment of parricides or murderers." The same thinker calls it a vice in one book and fitting in another. The dividing line was there from the start: **was the misfortune deserved?**

The person who drew that line most carefully was Kant. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) he separates two things. The pleasure of seeing your own lot look brighter against someone else's misfortune he accepts as "grounded in nature, according to the law of the imagination, namely that of contrast." It is a bit like a room feeling cosier while you watch the rain outside. But to delight directly in the misfortune itself, and even to wish for it, is "a secret hatred of human beings, and the direct opposite of the love of neighbour." Then he adds one line. The sweetest of these joys, and the one that "has the appearance of the greatest right," is the desire for revenge. The door of deservingness that Aristotle left open, Kant saw as the door to watch most closely.

Schopenhauer was blunter. He called schadenfreude "the worst trait in human nature," a feeling that differs from cruelty only as theory differs from practice. On the other side stands Nietzsche. In *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (1880) he explains it this way: when misfortune brings B down to A's level, A stops envying and is reconciled. Malicious joy is therefore "the commonest expression of victory and restoration of equality," and it has existed only since people learned to see one another as equals. In a society of fixed ranks a peasant does not measure himself against the fall of a lord. Only among people who believe they stand in the same line does another's misfortune enter my own accounts.

## A hut beside a palace

More than half a century after Nietzsche, his observation reappears in the language of social science: comparison, and relative position.

In 1847 Marx wrote in *Wage Labour and Capital*: "A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirement for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut." The house stays the same; the house next door changes its size.

During the Second World War, the sociologist Samuel Stouffer and his team surveyed American soldiers on a vast scale and found something odd (*The American Soldier*, 1949). Among men with one to two years of service, 24% of military police had become non-commissioned officers, against 47% in the Air Corps. Promotion came almost twice as fast in the Air Corps. Yet it was the Air Corps men who were more dissatisfied with their chances. The researchers' reading: being left behind where most of your peers have moved up stings far more than standing still where everyone stands still. That reading was given the name "relative deprivation."

In 1954 Leon Festinger turned this into a theory. People want to evaluate their abilities and opinions, and where no objective yardstick exists they evaluate themselves against others. And they choose **similar** others to compare with, which is Nietzsche's "equals" again. In 1988 Abraham Tesser added one more piece. Comparison hurts most when the other person is close to you and the domain matters to you. That is why a colleague's promotion stings more than a stranger's fortune, and why a Korean proverb says your stomach aches when your cousin buys land.

Economists measured it in money. In 1998 at the Harvard School of Public Health, Sara Solnick and David Hemenway asked people, assuming prices are the same: would you rather live in a world where you earn $50,000 a year and others earn $25,000, or one where you earn $100,000 and others earn $200,000? About half chose the first world, giving up half their real income to be ahead. The wish to be ahead was strongest for attractiveness and a supervisor's praise, and weakest for vacation time.

Erzo Luttmer linked an American household survey to local earnings (2005) and showed that, holding your own income fixed, a rise in your neighbours' earnings lowers your happiness, by "about the same order of magnitude" as a similar cut in your own income. The paper's title is "Neighbors as Negatives."

The cleanest evidence came from an accident. In 2008 a California newspaper opened a website where anyone could look up state employees' salaries. David Card and his colleagues emailed a randomly chosen group of staff at three University of California campuses to tell them about the site, then asked everyone about their satisfaction a few days later (2012). Four in five new users of the site looked up the pay of colleagues in their own department. Staff paid below their unit's median became less satisfied with their pay and their job, and more likely to say they would look for another job. Staff above the median? No change at all. Learning that they earned more than others did not make them happier.

The asymmetry is worth holding on to. Finding out you are behind hurts, but finding out you are ahead does not please you by the same amount. So what is the joy we feel when someone falls and we end up relatively ahead? Perhaps it is less the joy of being ahead than the relief of a pain, the pain of being behind, briefly letting up.

![A timeline in three horizontal lanes showing how thinking about others' misfortune and comparison has developed. The top lane, philosophy, "Is it deserved?": Aristotle in the 4th century BC (Ethics: always a bad feeling / Rhetoric: rejoice at deserved punishment), 1797 Kant (contrast is natural, wishing misfortune is a secret hatred of humanity), 1851 Schopenhauer (the worst trait in human nature), 1880 Nietzsche (a feeling born when people see each other as equals). The middle lane, social science, "How relative is it?": 1847 Marx (a small house beside a palace becomes a hut), 1949 Stouffer (the faster-promoted Air Corps was more dissatisfied, 24% vs 47%), 1954 Festinger (we measure ourselves against similar others), 1998 Solnick and Hemenway (about half chose being ahead of others), 2005 Luttmer (neighbours' income up is like my income down), 2012 Card et al. (salary disclosure hurt only those below the median). The bottom lane, psychology, "Where does the joy come from?": 1988 Tesser (it hurts most when close and important), 2002 Feather and Sherman (resentment of undeserved success predicts it), 2009 van de Ven et al. (benign and malicious envy), 2011 van Dijk et al. (a shaken self-esteem makes schadenfreude bigger), 2017 Tappin and McKay (the biggest illusion is that I am more moral), 2018 Gerber et al. (we don't seek those below us, but we take comfort when we meet them).](/uploads/6ffe8b517d245ba0.webp =720)

## What the joy tells you

So where does schadenfreude come from? From the 2000s psychologists brought the feeling into the lab and began to take it apart. As Richard Smith and colleagues summarise it, there are three main sources: envy, a sense of justice, and rivalry.

**Envy.** It is intuitive that schadenfreude is biggest when someone better off than us falls. But envy comes in two kinds. Niels van de Ven and colleagues in the Netherlands (2009) separated "benign envy," which makes you want to catch up, from "malicious envy," which makes you want to pull the other person down. In a 2018 meta-analysis by Jens Lange and colleagues pooling 4,366 people, schadenfreude went together only with malicious envy. The same work reported that malicious envy grows the more someone's advantage seems undeserved.

**Deservingness.** In Australia, Norman Feather had people read about others' successes and failures and asked how they reacted. In a study with Robert Sherman of 184 people (2002), the best predictor of schadenfreude was not envy but **resentment**: the sense that the person had no right to be where they were. That is the feeling of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It is also exactly the spot Kant warned about. A sense of justice gives schadenfreude its most convincing clothes.

**Rivalry.** Mina Cikara's experiments show how easily the feeling arises. Red Sox and Yankees fans were reported to show a response in the brain's reward area when the rival team failed (2011). More striking is a 2014 experiment. Even between two teams divided on a meaningless basis, once they were set up to compete, people took pleasure in the other side's bad luck. In a 2012 study, when people watched an envied, high-status group meet with mishaps, the smile muscles in their faces moved more than when other groups did. The face answered before anyone was asked.

There is a fourth source: **a shaken self**. Wilco van Dijk and colleagues in the Netherlands shook people's self-esteem in the lab and then had them read about someone else's failure. Those whose self-esteem had been threatened felt more schadenfreude. But those who had first gone through a "self-affirmation" exercise, recalling values that mattered to them, felt less. How welcome another's misfortune feels rises and falls with our own state, not theirs.

The feeling starts very early. Simone Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues in Israel (2014) had mothers show favour to another child in front of their own, then spill water on a book so that the reading stopped. Children from 24 months to a little over three years enjoyed the mishap more right after seeing the favouritism. In a study of 182 children aged 7 to 13, Nikolaus Steinbeis and Tania Singer (2013) found that envy and schadenfreude decreased with age. It is a feeling we are born with, but also one we learn to handle as we grow.

There are brain-imaging studies too. In 2009 Hidehiko Takahashi's team in Japan reported in *Science* that envy engaged the anterior cingulate cortex, that the ventral striatum, a region linked to reward, became active when the envied person suffered, and that greater envy went with a greater later pleasure response. But there were only 19 participants and the study has not been directly replicated, so it is too early to say flatly that schadenfreude switches on the brain's reward circuit. Several well-known imaging studies in this area also appear on a list criticised for inflated statistics (Vul et al., 2009).

## Do we really compare all the time?

What about the feeling behind the notebook entry, the impression that "everyone lives like that"?

In 1981 Thomas Wills proposed the theory of "downward comparison": when threatened, people deliberately seek out those worse off to feel better. It was plausible and long cited. But when Jonathan Gerber, Ladd Wheeler and Jerry Suls re-examined 145 studies in 2018, the prediction was not supported. People looked up more often, and even under threat they did not go out of their way to look down. When they **came across** someone worse off, though, they did feel better. In short: people don't go looking for others' misfortune, but when they meet it, they take comfort.

Someone also measured how often we compare. Kenneth Summerville and Neal Roese (2008) pinged 34 university students seven times a day at random for two weeks and had them write down what they had just been thinking. Thoughts that counted as comparisons made up 12.2% of the total. Of those comparisons, comparisons with other people were 24.2%, fewer than comparisons with a future self (30.9%) or "if only" thoughts about what might have been (25.5%). Comparisons with a past self made up 19.4%. People look at others less than they think, and at themselves more. It is a small study, but it does suggest that the impression "everyone is always measuring themselves against everyone else" may be inflated.

And comparison happens on its own. Daniel Gilbert and colleagues (1995) showed that people compare themselves automatically with the person in front of them even when they don't mean to. But the same research showed that when people judge the comparison to be inappropriate, they soon "mentally undo" it. What arises is hard to stop. Whether to hold on to it is something we can choose.

## The "I'm different" trap

Now back to the moment in the notebook when I caught myself. Watching people enjoy others' misfortune and thinking, "I'm not like that." Isn't that a comparison too?

Research says yes, and a very common one.

Ben Tappin and Ryan McKay (2017) had 270 people rate themselves and an average person on thirty traits. People saw themselves as better than average in many respects, but the inflation was largest and most universal not for intelligence or sociability but for **morality**. Almost every participant did it. And the illusion had nothing to do with how high or low their self-esteem was.

Nicholas Epley and David Dunning's experiment (2000) cuts deeper. Before a campus charity sale of daffodils, students were asked about buying one. More than 80% said they would buy one themselves, and estimated that about half of other students would. In the end, 43% bought one. Their predictions about others were nearly right. What they got wrong was their prediction about themselves. The paper is called "Feeling 'Holier Than Thou'."

George Goethals (1991) gave the pairing a name. People think their good qualities are rarer than other people's (false uniqueness) and their bad ones are shared by everyone (false consensus). "Most people enjoy others' misfortune. I don't." Those two sentences are exactly that pair. Emily Pronin and colleagues (2002) added one more: people believe they are less biased than others.

So the moment in the notebook was an accurate instinct. The instant I look down on other people's schadenfreude, I climb up the scale of morality on top of their misfortune. Still, I don't think this is a reason for gloom. No one has fully escaped this trap. **Noticing** it is about the best place one can start.

One more thing to add. In a 1997 experiment by Sonja Lyubomirsky and Lee Ross, happy people also felt better when told they had done better than the person next to them. The difference between happy and unhappy people was not whether they compared. It was that happy people were **less hurt** when the person beside them did better. If the goal is to become someone who never compares, you will probably fail. Becoming someone less shaken by comparison is possible.

## Korea on the scale

There is a reason this subject may land especially hard. When the Pew Research Center asked people in 17 advanced economies in 2021 what makes life meaningful, family came first in most of them. South Korea was the only one where material well-being came first. But only 19% gave that answer, so rather than reading it as "Koreans care only about money," it is more accurate to say answers were scattered and money edged ahead. In this year's World Happiness Report, South Korea ranked 67th of 147 countries, its lowest since the first report in 2012. In the 2025 Social Survey by Statistics Korea, 57.7% of respondents said the chances of moving up the social ladder in their generation were low.

Even so, it would be wrong to write that "Koreans naturally enjoy others' misfortune." Cross-cultural research has reported that East Asians tend more to seek upward comparisons, looking at those better off in order to learn, rather than pulling others down for comfort. Downward comparison for comfort was, if anything, reported more often in Western samples. There is also a popular story that the cousin-buys-land proverb originally meant your stomach hurt because you had to go and spread manure on the new field, but I could find no written source supporting it. The honest thing is to read the proverb as it stands: an observation, like Tesser's experiments, that a close person's success stings most.

## So, is it legitimate?

Here is the answer to the notebook's question, as far as today's trail goes.

![Three boxes side by side. The first, "It arises," shows a rainy window and a warm lamp with the text "The pleasure of your lot looking better by contrast. It happens on its own. Kant: grounded in nature." The second, "You hold on to it," shows a phone screen with arrows passing posts along, and the text "Relishing the misfortune itself, and wishing for more. Kant: a secret hatred of humanity." The third, "It wears justice," shows the scales of justice with the text "Joy that feels right because 'they had it coming.' Kant: the sweetest, with the appearance of the greatest right." Below runs the line "What arises is hard to stop. Whether to hold on to it is a choice."](/uploads/4e26b499825f6417.webp =720)

First, **the feeling arising** does not seem to be something to judge as legitimate or not. Comparison happens automatically, and two-year-olds have it. Even Kant called the relief that comes from contrast natural. If the thought "phew, glad it wasn't me" crossed your mind when someone fell, there is no need to declare yourself a bad person.

Second, **holding on to it and feeding it** is different. Waiting for the next failure, passing the story around, wishing the person would fall further. This is what Kant called "a secret hatred of human beings." It belongs not to feeling but to choice.

Third, the thing to watch most closely is **schadenfreude wearing the face of justice**. It isn't strange to welcome a cheat being punished. As Aristotle said, that can be the joy of seeing justice done. But as Feather's research shows, people are skilled at renaming envy as resentment. Asking whether what I welcome is the **outcome** being set right, or the person's **pain**: that is roughly what Kant's warning becomes in today's words.

And whichever box it falls into, schadenfreude is a gauge of my own state. As in van Dijk's experiments, when the joy is large, something on my side is usually shaken. If the gladness feels unusually strong, it is worth looking at yourself before looking at the other person.

You can try it below. The first tab borrows Solnick and Hemenway's question format and asks you to choose, for income, education, looks, praise and vacation, between "a world where you are ahead of others" and "a world where you have more in absolute terms." In the second tab you rate your schadenfreude from 0 to 4 for eight situations, and it draws whether that joy leans on envy, deservingness, rivalry or a shaken self, and points to which of Kant's three boxes to watch. The third tab is a toy model of how satisfaction changes with your rank when coworkers' salaries are disclosed.

```map /embed/joyscale-2026-en.html 4:5
The Joy Scale. The first tab, "Hut or palace," borrows the question format of Solnick and Hemenway (1998) and asks you to choose, across five domains (income, education, looks, praise, vacation), between a world where you are ahead of others and a world where you have more in absolute terms, then compares your choices with the original survey's pattern (about half chose being ahead on the income question; the pull was strongest for looks and praise and weakest for vacation). The second tab, "Where did that joy come from?", asks you to rate your schadenfreude from 0 to 4 for eight situations, such as a colleague failing a promotion review, a line-cutting car being pulled over, or a rival team losing; it draws a radar on four axes (envy, deservingness, rivalry, a shaken self) and marks which of Kant's three boxes (it arises, you hold on to it, it wears justice) applies. The four axes borrow the factor structure in the research, but the weights for each situation are the author's guesses, and it is not a diagnosis. The third tab, "Behind hurts more," is a toy model in which you move your rank among 21 coworkers and switch salary disclosure on and off, following the direction found by Card et al. (2012): satisfaction falls only below the median and does not rise above it
```

## Stepping a little off the scale

Finally, the question I also wanted to note down. How can one become a little freer of this kind of comparison and move towards a happiness of one's own? Here what matters is not whether something works but **how much**. Some methods commonly recommended in self-help books have weaker evidence than you might think.

Starting with the better-supported ones.

- **Give less weight to goals like money, status and looks.** In a meta-analysis by Helga Dittmar and colleagues (2014) pooling 753 effect sizes, the correlation between materialism and well-being was about r = -0.15. Not large, but consistent across studies. As Solnick and Hemenway's results suggest, shifting weight towards things that are hard to compare, like vacation, or things that aren't ranked, like experiences and relationships, reduces the occasions for stepping onto the scale at all.
- **Spend less time watching other people's highlights.** In an experiment by Hunt Allcott and colleagues (2020), 1,661 people deactivated Facebook for four weeks and their subjective well-being rose by 0.09 standard deviations. That looks small, but the authors put it at roughly 25 to 40% of the effect of typical psychological interventions such as therapy. Philippe Verduyn and colleagues (2015) argued that the problem lies less in social media itself than in the envy that comes from passively scrolling. Claims that social media does great harm, though, are mixed across studies and the effects are mostly small.
- **Reinterpret the feeling rather than suppressing it.** In research by James Gross and Oliver John (2003), a habit of suppressing emotions went with lower well-being, and a habit of reinterpreting situations went with higher well-being. I found no direct experiment showing that suppressing envy backfires, but when schadenfreude rises, changing the question to "where do I feel I've fallen behind right now?" is one way of reinterpreting.

Moderate evidence.

- **Self-compassion instead of self-esteem.** When Kristin Neff and Roos Vonk (2009) surveyed 2,187 people, self-compassion moved more strongly against social comparison than self-esteem did, and unlike self-esteem it was unrelated to narcissism. Self-esteem tends to lean on "me, better than others"; self-compassion leans on "me, allowed to fail." Effects of self-compassion training have also been reported (Ferrari et al., 2019, 27 studies, g = 0.56–0.75), but the comparison groups were mostly waitlists, so the effects may look larger than they are.
- **Compare yourself with yesterday's self.** People already compare with themselves more often than with others (the 12.2% study above). This is about strengthening that habit. But as Anne Wilson and Michael Ross (2001) showed, people also run down their past selves to create an illusion of growth, so keeping a record is the honest way.
- **Respond actively to other people's good news.** In research by Shelly Gable and colleagues (2004), relationships in which partners asked about each other's good news and rejoiced in it with genuine interest were more satisfying. The Buddhist idea of mudita, joy in others' joy, and "freudenfreude," a word coined as the opposite of schadenfreude, point in the same direction. The research using the name freudenfreude itself, though, so far consists of only a few short reports.

Weaker than you might think.

- **Gratitude journals.** In a meta-analysis by Don Davis and colleagues (2016), gratitude interventions beat doing nothing (d = 0.31), but showed no difference from groups doing other positive activities (d = -0.03). And "being grateful by thinking of people worse off than me" is itself a downward comparison. Gratitude that uses another's misfortune as a stepping stone circles back to today's question. An alternative is the "mental subtraction" tested by Minkyung Koo and colleagues (2008): instead of comparing yourself with others, imagine what life would be like **without** something good you have now. The comparison is then not with other people but with another possible version of yourself.

Philosophy offers direction rather than experiments. Seneca wrote in *On Anger*: "No one will ever be happy who is tormented by someone happier (numquam erit felix quem torquebit felicior)." The *Analects* of Confucius has this passage: "The noble person helps others bring their good to completion and does not help bring their bad to completion. The petty person does the opposite (君子成人之美 不成人之惡 小人反是)." And what Kant set against schadenfreude was a line from Terence: "I am a human being; nothing that happens to human beings is foreign to me."

## In closing

Back to the notebook's question. Is it legitimate to feel happy because of someone else's misfortune?

As far as I followed it today, it is hard to judge the legitimacy of the joy **arising**. Two-year-olds have it, and Kant called it natural. The question of legitimacy comes after that. Will you hold on to it? Will you give it the name of justice and let it grow? And one step further: before asking whether the joy is legitimate, you can ask what it is telling you. The days when schadenfreude rises strongly are usually the days when my own side of the scale is tilting.

The lesson I learned as a child, not to find happiness in others' misfortune, was not wrong. But it is more honest to human beings to read it not as "don't have such feelings" but as "don't live leaning on them." That everyone else seems to live this way, and that I feel different from such people, are things that happen on the same scale. We may never step off it completely, but there are ways to put less weight on it. Comparing with yesterday's self rather than with others, spending time on things that aren't ranked, and now and then being the first to rejoice at someone else's good news.

*A Page for Today* is a series in which I open my idea notebook to a random page and lay that day's thoughts on the line I find there. Today's line was "Is it legitimate to feel happy because of someone else's misfortune?"

- Philosophy: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II.6–7 and *Rhetoric* II.9 · Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Doctrine of Virtue §36 (Ak. 6:459–461) · Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena* II (T. B. Saunders trans., *On Human Nature*) · Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human* I §103 and II, *The Wanderer and His Shadow* §27 · Seneca, *On Anger* III.30.3 · *Analects* 12.16 · J. Portmann, *When Bad Things Happen to Other People* (2000)
- Comparison and relative position: K. Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital* (1847) · S. A. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier* Vol. I (1949), pp. 250–251 · L. Festinger, Human Relations 7(2), 1954 · A. Tesser, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 21, 1988 · T. A. Wills, Psychological Bulletin 90(2), 1981 · J. P. Gerber, L. Wheeler, J. Suls, Psychological Bulletin 144(2), 2018 · S. J. Solnick, D. Hemenway, J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 37(3), 1998 · E. F. P. Luttmer, QJE 120(3), 2005 · D. Card, A. Mas, E. Moretti, E. Saez, AER 102(6), 2012
- Schadenfreude: R. H. Smith, *The Joy of Pain* (2013) · N. T. Feather, R. Sherman, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28(7), 2002 · W. W. van Dijk et al., Cognition and Emotion 25(2), 2011 · N. van de Ven, M. Zeelenberg, R. Pieters, Emotion 9(3), 2009 · J. Lange, A. Weidman, J. Crusius, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 114(4), 2018 · M. Cikara, S. T. Fiske, Social Psychological and Personality Science 3(1), 2012 · M. Cikara et al., Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55, 2014 · H. Takahashi et al., Science 323, 2009 · E. Vul et al., Perspectives on Psychological Science 4(3), 2009 · S. G. Shamay-Tsoory et al., Frontiers in Psychology 5, 2014 · N. Steinbeis, T. Singer, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 115(1), 2013
- People and illusions: K. Summerville, N. J. Roese, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 44(3), 2008 · D. T. Gilbert, R. B. Giesler, K. A. Morris, JPSP 69(2), 1995 · B. M. Tappin, R. T. McKay, Social Psychological and Personality Science 8(6), 2017 · N. Epley, D. Dunning, JPSP 79(6), 2000 · G. R. Goethals et al., 1991 · E. Pronin et al., PSPB 28(3), 2002 · S. Lyubomirsky, L. Ross, JPSP 73(6), 1997
- Korea: Pew Research Center, *What Makes Life Meaningful?* (Nov. 2021) · World Happiness Report 2026 · Statistics Korea, 2025 Social Survey
- Stepping off the scale: H. Dittmar et al., JPSP 107(5), 2014 · H. Allcott et al., AER 110(3), 2020 · P. Verduyn et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144(2), 2015 · J. J. Gross, O. P. John, JPSP 85(2), 2003 · K. D. Neff, R. Vonk, Journal of Personality 77(1), 2009 · M. Ferrari et al., Mindfulness 10, 2019 · A. E. Wilson, M. Ross, JPSP 80(4), 2001 · S. L. Gable et al., JPSP 87(2), 2004 · D. E. Davis et al., Journal of Counseling Psychology 63(1), 2016 · M. Koo et al., JPSP 95(5), 2008

